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Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts
of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the potential impacts ofthe proposed nuclear waste repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, upon tourism, retirement and job-related migration, and business
development in Las Vegas and the state. Adverse impacts may be expected to result from
perceptions of risk, stigmatization, and socially amplified reactions to "unfortunate events"
associated with the repository (major and minor accidents, discoveries of radiation releases,
evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt the facility, etc.). The conceptual
underpinnings of risk perception, stigmatization, and social amplification are discussed and
empirical data are presented to demonstrate how nuclear images associated with Las Vegas and
the State of Nevada might trigger adverse economic effects. The possibility that intense negative
imagery associated with the repository may cause significant harm to Nevada's economy can no
longer be ignored by serious attempts to assess the risks and impacts ofthis unique facility. The
behavioral processes described here appear relevant as well to the social impact assessment of
any proposed facility that produces, uses, transports, or disposes ofhazardous materials.
Key Words: perceived risk, stigma, economic impacts, nuclear waste, social impact
assessment
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Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts
of a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada
New Orleans, Louisiana —This is New Orleans! Air conditioning ... Al Hirt...
Andrew Jackson ... antebellumplantations ... antiques ... Antoine's ... Arnaud's
... Audobon Park... bananas Foster... Basin Street.. .Battle ofNew Orleans ...
bayous ... Bourbon Street... breakfast at Brennan's ... Cafe du Monde ... cafe
au lait and beignets ... Cajun ... Canal Street... chicory coffee ... "cities ofthe
dead"... Commander's Palace ... courtyards ... Creole cuisine ... Dixieland...
Duelling Oaks ... French Market .... French Quarter or "Vieux Carre" ...
Galatoire's... Garden District... Lafitte... lace balconies '... Lake Pontchartrain
... levees ... Longue Vue Gardens ... the Longs ofLouisiana ... Mardi Gras ...
OldAbsinthe House ... oysters Rockefeller ... Neville Brothers ... pecan pralines
... Pete Fountain ... Preservation Hall ... Ramos gin fizz ... riverboats ...
shrimps ...St. Charles streetcar... Storyville ... streetcar named Desire ... Sugar
Bowl... Superdome ... Uptown ... voo-doo!1
The National Environmental Policy Act passed by Congress in 1969 established the
requirement for an environmental impact statement for any "major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." Section 101 of this act states that its major
purpose is not only to maintain environmental quality but also to "fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements" of U.S. citizens. This requirement for a social and behavioral science
component with every environmental impact statement led to the birth of a field known as social
impact assessment. °'3) The present study attempts to demonstrate the importance of perceived
risk in social impact assessment, within the context of a specific project-the proposed national
repository for disposal of high-level nuclear waste.
1 Images characterize places, as is illustrated by this introduction to the announcement for
the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association in New Orleans,
Louisiana (American Psychologist, March 1989, p. 583).
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In December, 1987, the U.S. Congress amended the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and
authorized the Department of Energy to determine whether Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is a
geologically sound and technically feasible site for disposal of high-level nuclear waste. If the
site passes a setof prescribed technical criteria, a repository will be constructed there to dispose
of nuclear waste from the nation's commercial power plants.
Much effort has been, and will continue to be, devoted to characterizing the physical and
biological risks associated with construction and operation of this unique facility, which must
safely contain a large volume of highly radioactive material for a time period that is twice as
long as recorded human history. Socioeconomic risks, though less studied, are also important.
This paper addresses the following question pertaining to social impacts: What is the potential
for a high-level nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain to have adverse economic effects
on the city of Las Vegas and the State of Nevada during the period of constructing and filling
the repository (approximately 40-60 years)?
The economic impacts of concern to us here include reduction in short-term visits to the
city and state by vacationers or conventioneers, effects on long-term residents (moving out of
the region, reduced in-migration of retirees), and reduced ability to attract new businesses.
Assessment of these impacts is obviously important to citizensand officials of Nevada, who need
to know what economic consequences to expect if Yucca Mountain is developed as the
repository. Information about possible economic impacts may also be relevant to the final
decision itself, regarding the acceptability of the Yucca Mountain site.
Empirical research on this topic faces some major obstacles, however. Changes in
scientific knowledge and changes in public opinion are inherently difficult to forecast. For
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example, both scientific and public views about the risks of nuclear energy have changed
dramatically since the "Atoms for Peace" program began in the 1950's. An obstacle to survey
research is the fact that people may not really know how the repository will affect their future
preferences and decisions. For example, asking people to project the repository's impacts on
vacation decisions to be made many years hence may, in effect, be asking them to "tell more
than they can know."(4) Studies by Baker, Moss, West and Weyant^ and West and Baker*6*
indicate that answers to questions about the impact of nuclear facilities on future behavior may
not be trustworthy.
Despite these difficulties, there are theoretical reasons to expect that the repository may
produce adverse economic impacts. In this study we develop a method for assessing impacts
that is not dependent on direct questioning of people who are unfamiliar with the decisions of
concern here. We then use this method to assess the potential impacts from a repository at
Yucca Mountain.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
Adverse impacts from the proposed Yucca Mountain repository may beexpected toresult
from two related social processes. One has to do with perceptions of risk and socially amplified
reactions to "unfortunate events" associated with the repository (major and minor accidents,
discoveries of radiation releases, evidence of mismanagement, attempts to sabotage or disrupt
the facility, etc.). The second process that may trigger significant adverse impacts is that of
stigmatization.
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Perceptions of Risk and Social Amplification of Risk
Nuclear waste has several unique characteristics that strongly suggest the potential for
a repository to have adverse effects upon the region in which it is located.
1. Although technical experts are supremely confident that nuclear wastes can be
transported and disposed of safel/7^, the technology of high-level nuclear waste disposal is
complex and largely untried. There are genuine hazards associated with such a facility, and the
nature of these hazards is only partly understood.
2. From the time that radioactivity was discovered shortly before 1900, nuclear energy
has been unique in the power of the imagery and symbolism that has surrounded it. Weart^
traces the salience and persistence with which both positive and negative meanings have become
attached to things nuclear. His analysis demonstrates the strength of nuclear imagery and its
broad penetration into our social and cultural consciousness over the past 90 years.
3. Contemporary evaluations of nuclear power and nuclear waste could hardly be more
negative. Nuclear power stands out in studies of risk perception as unknown, uncontrollable,
and dreaded, with the perceived potential to produce immense numbers of fatalities, even in
future generations.0010 Nuclear waste tends to be perceived in a similarly negative way.<1213)
These public perceptions have evoked harsh reactions from experts. One noted
psychiatrist wrote that "the irrational fear of nuclear plants is based on a mistaken assessment
of the risks" (Dupont14, p. 8). A nuclear physicist and leading advocate of nuclear power
contended that".. .thepublic has been driven insane over fear of radiation [from nuclear power].
I use the word 'insane' purposefully since one of its definitions is loss of contact with reality.
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The public's understanding of radiation dangers has virtually lost all contact with the actual
dangers as understood by scientists" (Cohen15, p. 31).
Research on risk perception paints a different picture, demonstrating that people's deep
anxieties are linked to numerous realities, including the reality of radiation's unique and
powerful qualities, the reality of nuclear power's linksto nuclear weapons proliferation and war,
the reality of many serious examples of mismanagement (e.g., the releases of radioactive
material into the environment from military reactor sites), and the reality of extensive media
coverage documenting major and minor problems and controversies involving nuclear
technologies. Attempts to "educate" or reassure the public and bring their perceptions in line
with those of industry experts face great difficulties because industry and government lack trust
and credibility and because evidence of incompetence is much more persuasive than evidence
of competence.
Perceptions of risk play a key role ina process labeled "social amplification of risk.M(16)
Social amplification is triggered by the occurrence of an adverse event, which could be a major
or minor accident, a discovery of pollution, an incident of sabotage, and so on. Risk
amplification reflects the fact that the adverse impacts of such an event sometimes extend far
beyond the direct damages to victims and property and may result in massive indirect impacts
such as litigation against a company or loss of sales, increased regulation of an industry, and so
on. In some cases, all companies within an industry are affected, regardless of which company
was responsible for the mishap. Thus, theevent can be thought of as a stone dropped in a pond.
The ripples spread outward, encompassing first thedirectly affected victims, then the responsible
company or agency, and, in the extreme, reaching other companies, agencies, or industries.
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Examples of events resulting in extreme higher-order impacts include the chemical
manufacturing accident at Bhopal, India, the disastrous launch of the space shuttle Challenger,
thenuclear-reactor accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, theadverse effects of thedrug
Thalidomide, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the adulteration of Tylenol capsules with cyanide.
An important feature of social amplification is that the direct impacts need not be too large to
trigger major indirect impacts. The seven deaths due to the Tylenol tampering resulted in more
than 125,000 stories in the print media alone and inflicted losses ofmore than one billion dollars
upon the Johnson &Johnson Company, due to the damaged image of the product.(,7)
It appears likely that multiple mechanisms contribute to the social amplification ofrisk.
First, extensive media coverage ofan event can contribute to heightened perceptions ofrisk and
amplified impacts.°8) Second, aparticular risk or risk event may enter into the agenda of social
groups, or what Mazur(19) terms the partisans, within the community or nation. The attack on
the apple growth-regulator "Alar" by the Natural Resources Defense Council demonstrates the
important impacts that special-interest groups can trigger.^
A third mechanism of amplification arises outof the interpretation of unfortunate events
as clues or signals regarding the magnitude of the risk and the adequacy ofthe risk-management
process.(1018) The informativeness or signal potential of a mishap, and thus its potential social
impact, appears to be systematically related to the perceived characteristics of the hazard. An
accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that
caused to the victims' families and friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood
system (e.g., a train wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system (or one
perceived as poorly understood), such as a nuclear waste repository or a recombinant DNA
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laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it isperceived as a harbinger of future and
\
possibly catastrophic mishaps.
The concept ofaccidents as signals helps explain our society's strong response to mishaps
involving nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Because the risks associated with nuclear energy
are seen as poorly understood and catastrophic, accidents anywhere in the world may be seen
as omens of disaster everywhere thereare nuclear reactors and wastes, thus producing responses
(e.g., increased regulation; public opposition) that carry large socioeconomic impacts.
Stigmatization
Substantial socioeconomic impacts may also result from the stigma associated with a
nuclear waste repository. The word stigma was used by the ancient Greeks to refer to bodily
marks or brands that were designed to signal infamy or disgrace-to show, for example, that the
bearer was a slave or a criminal. As used today, the word denotes someone "marked" as
deviant, flawed, limited, spoiled, or generally undesirable in the view of some observer. When
the stigmatizing characteristic is observed, the person is denigrated or avoided. Prime targets
for stigmatization are members of minority groups, the aged, homosexuals, drug addicts,
alcoholics, and persons afflicted with physical deformities or mental disabilities.
Although the sociological and psychological treatment of stigma typically pertains to
interpersonal contexts far removed from that of radioactive waste disposal, the concept of stigma
can clearly be generalized from persons to environments.*2" Times Beach, Missouri, and Love
Canal, New York, come quickly to mind as examples of stigmatized environments.
A dramatic example of stigmatization involving radiation occurred in September, 1987,
in Goiania, Brazil, where two men searching for scrap metal dismantled a cancer therapy device
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in an abandoned clinic. In doing so, they sawed open a capsule containing 28 grams of cesium
chloride. Children and workers nearby were attracted to the glowing material and began playing
with it. Before the danger was realized, several hundred people became contaminated and four
persons eventually died from acute radiation poisoning. Publicity about the incident led to
stigmatization of the region and its residents.*22* Hotels in other parts of the country refused to
allow Goiania residents to register; airline pilots refused to fly with Goiania residents on board;
automobiles driven by Goianians were stoned; hotel occupancy in the region dropped 60% for
six weeks following the incident and virtually all conventions were canceled during this period.
The sale prices of clothing and other products manufactured in Goiania dropped by 40% after
the first news reports and remained depressed for a period of 30-45 days, despite the fact that
none of these items was ever shown to have been contaminated.
RATIONALE AND METHOD
Building on the theoretical concepts and research described above, we designed a series
of studies to determine the potential for a nuclear-waste repository at Yucca Mountain to have
adverse effects on tourism, migration, and business location decisions.
Our first efforts followed the direct approach of asking people in a national survey to
indicate whether a nuclear waste repository located 100 miles from a site would reduce the
desirability of that site as a place to attend a convention, vacation, raise a family, retire, or
locate a new business. Depending upon which of these activities was targeted in the question,
between 41% (attend a convention) and 73% (raise a family) said that a repository would reduce
the desirability of the region. It appeared that the more time people thought they would be
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spending in an area, the more likely they were to assert that the repository would make it aless
desirable place in which to be.
In response to direct questions, interviewees consistently anticipated that a repository
would decrease the attractiveness ofa place. However, in light of the aforementioned problems
with projecting impacts far into the future on the basis of answers to hypothetical questions, such
data are suspect. Therefore, the present studies employed an indirect strategy, based on the
notion ofenvironmental imagery. Studies ofenvironmental imagery appear to have the potential
to provide a sound and defensible theoretical framework from which to understand and project
possible impacts of a nuclear-waste repository on tourism and other important behaviors.
Accordingly, the present studies were designed to:
• demonstrate the concept ofenvironmental imagery and show how it can be measured
• assess the relationship between imagery and choice behavior
• describe economic impacts that might occur as a result ofaltered images and choices.
The concept of imagery is not new to the study of environment and behavior.
Geographers, cognitive and environmental psychologists, marketing strategists, and consumer
theorists have written at length about the importance of images in our environmental
consciousness and our behavior.(923-27) However, to our knowledge, no one has used a design
such as ours to link imagery to the behaviors of concern here.
Our research was designed to test the following three propositions:
1) Images associated with environments have diverse positive and negative affective
meanings that influence preferences (e.g., in this case, preferences for sites in which to vacation,
retire, find a job, or start a new business).
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2) A nuclear-waste repository evokes a wide variety of strongly negative images,
consistent with extreme perceptions of risk and stigmatization.
3) The repository at Yucca Mountain and the negative images it evokes will, over time,
become increasingly salient in the images of Nevada and of Las Vegas.
If these three propositions are true, it seems quite plausible that, as the imagery of Las
Vegas and of Nevada becomes increasingly associated with the repository and things nuclear,
the attractiveness of these places to tourists, job seekers, retirees, and business developers will
decrease and theirchoices of Las Vegas and Nevada within sets of competing sites will decrease.
Support for these three propositions, therefore, would demonstrate the mechanism
whereby the repository could produce adverse affects upon tourism, migration, and business
development in Nevada and this demonstration would occur without having to ask people to
make introspective judgments about their future behaviors.
Survey Design
In order to test the propositions described above, we first conducted three extensive
studies of imagery and preference. Studies 1and 2 surveyed representative samples of residents
in Phoenix, Arizona. Study 1 elicited images for four cities and asked people to indicate their
preferences among these cities as places to vacation, take a new job, or retire. Study 2 did the
same for four states. Study 3 surveyed a national sample of business executives, asking for their
images of each of four cities and their preferences among these cities as places to open a new
business or expand an existing business. All three surveys were conducted by telephone. Each
survey had a sample size of about 400 persons.
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The survey questions in Studies 1and 2 were nearly identical. The cities questionnaire
asked respondents to provide images for San Diego, Las Vegas, Denver, and Los Angeles. The
states questionnaire elicited imagery for California, Nevada, Colorado, and New Mexico. These
cities and states, in addition to Las Vegas and Nevada, were chosen for the study because they
are important vacation destinations for residents of Phoenix.
The images were elicited using a version of the "method of continued associations,*m
adapted for use in a telephone interview.2 Image elicitation was always the first task in the
survey. In the cities survey, the elicitation interview proceeded as follows:
"My first question involves word association. For example, when I mention the
word baseball, you might think of the World Series, Reggie Jackson,
summertime, or even hot dogs. Today, I am interested in the first SIX thoughts
or images that come to mind when you hear the name of a PLACE.
Think about for a minute. When you think about
[CITY] [CITY]
what is the first thought or image that comes to mind?
What is the next thought or image you have when I say
[CITY]
What is another thought or image you have about
[CITY]
Your next thought or image?
[CITY]
2 The study of associations has a long history in psychology, going back to Galton*29*,
Wundt*3**, and Freud.*31* Szalay and Deese argue that word-association techniques are
easy and efficient ways of determining the contents and representational systems of
human minds without requiring those contents to be expressed in. the full discursive
structure of human language. In fact, they argue, we may reveal ourselves in
associations in ways we might find difficult to do ifwe were required to spell out the full
propositions behind these associations through answers to questions.
{
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This continued until six associations were produced or the respondent drew a blank.
Then the procedure was repeated for the next city. The order of the cities was rotated across
respondents. The procedure was identical for the states and business location surveys.
Following the elicitation of images, respondents were asked to rate each image they gave
on a scale ranging from very positive (+2), somewhat positive (+1), neutral (0), somewhat
negative (-1), or very negative (-2).
Respondents in Studies 1 and 2 were then asked to rank the cities/states according to their
preference for a vacation site (long weekend vacation for cities; week or longer vacation for
states). Subsequent questions asked for a preference ranking among these cities or states as
retirement sites or places to move to assuming equally attractive job offers in each place, much
in the same manner as vacation preferences were elicited. Additional questions assessed the
extent of previous visits or living experiences in each of the cities or states, and the existence
of family or close friends in each of those places.
Next, up to six images were elicited to the stimulus "underground nuclear waste storage
facility" and the stimulus "nuclear test site."
The survey also asked "in which state has the federal government proposed to build an
underground facility for storing radioactive wastes?" and "in which state is the nuclear test site
located?"3
The survey of corporate decision makers first elicited images for each of four
cities-Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver, and Albuquerque-and then asked the respondents to
3 The nation's nuclear weapons test site is located in Nye County, Nevada, adjacent to the
proposed repository site at Yucca Mountain.
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evaluate these images on the -2 to +2 rating scale, as in the other surveys. These individuals
were then asked to rank these cities in order of preference as a location for opening or
expanding a business, assuming that market conditions and cost conditions were about equal.
Survey Samples
Adults 18 years of age and older in Phoenix were surveyed with the cities questionnaire
during the period April 13 through May 4, 1988. The states telephone survey was conducted
in Phoenix between May 16 and June 8, 1988. The survey of corporate decision makers took
place between June 9 and July 29, 1988.4 Ineach survey, more than 70% of the initial contacts
resulted in completed interviews.
RESULTS
Cities Survey
Respondent characteristics. When asked "who in your household makes the final
decision on vacations?", about 80% of the respondents said either that they did this themselves,
or did so jointly with their spouse or partner. The percentage of respondents that had visited
the target cities during the past five years ranged from 40% (Denver) to 65% (Los Angeles).
Of those persons, the percentage that had spent a weekend in these cities during the past two
years ranged between 50% (Denver) and 76% (San Diego). These self reports support the
choice of Phoenix residents as an appropriate target population for Las Vegas tourism and
support the selection ofSan Diego, Los Angeles, and Denver as appropriate competing sites for
vacations.
The sample was selected from the 1988 edition of Who's Who in Corporate Real Estate.
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Images. In response to the stimulus word "Las Vegas," images associated with
gambling, casinos, hotels, bright lights and entertainment were dominant, followed by imagery
pertaining to the climate and physical landscape, money, crime, and immorality. Imagery
related to nuclear waste and the nuclear test site was very infrequent (only 2 images out of more
than 1500). Table I presents the hierarchy of images elicited by the stimulus phrase
"underground nuclear waste storage facility." The imagery was overwhelmingly negative. By
far, the most frequent associations were dangerousness and death and their synonyms, followed
by pollution, negative concepts, and radiation. Although we did not ask people to score these
images, it seems likely that most of them would have been judged "very negative," a -2 on our
five-point scale. Although some images pertaining to "necessity" came at the 17th position, they
were very few in number (17) and included the phrase "necessary evil" given by two
respondents. The words "Nevada" and "Las Vegas" were weakly associated with the repository,
which was not surprising, given the low level of awareness of where the site is proposed to be
located.5
Insert Table I about here
Images of the nuclear test site were similarly negative and exhibited considerable overlap
in content with the images of a nuclear-waste storage facility. Major test-site images included
5 Only 19.6% of the cities sample knew that Nevada had been selected as the leading
candidate for an underground facility for disposing of radioactive wastes and 46.8%
knew that the nuclear weapons test site is in Nevada.
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radiation, death, danger, cancer, destruction, and Nevada. More people associated Nevada with
the test site (82 mentions) than with the repository.
Predicting preferences from images. To predict preferences among cities from images,
we developed a scoring rule, the summation model, which simply sums the ratings for all the
images a respondent produced for each city. A person's preferences among cities are
hypothesized to be predictable from these sums.
An example, illustrating the application of the summation model to the data of one
respondent, is given in Table II. For this respondent, the rank order of summation scores
exactly matched the preference order for vacation sites.
Insert Table II about here
When ranks generated by the summation model were compared to the actual ranks
generated by the respondents when they stated their preferences, the model did quite well,
correctly predicting 55% of the number 1ranked vacation cities and 56% of the fourth ranked
cities, with somewhat less accuracy in predicting intermediate ranks (if the model lacked
predictive validity, we would expect a 25% hit rate by chance). The exact rank order of four
cities generated by the summation model matched the exact rank order of the respondent 26.4%
of the time (perfect matching of ranks would be expected by chance only 4.2% of the time).
A second set of tests was conducted with the summation model. Each of the four cities
was paired with every other cities-making six pairs in all. For every respondent and every pair,
the image score for city Bwas subtracted from the image score of city A. The resulting 2,346
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A-B scores across all respondents were ordered from extreme negative to extreme positive and
this distribution was partitioned into five subsets, as equal in size as possible (range = 419 to
511 comparisons in each subset). Finally, within each subset, thepercentage of respondents who
ranked city A more favorably than city B as a vacation site was calculated. The plot of the
mean A-B difference was most negative (mean = -6.2), A was preferred as a vacation site for
only 27.4% of the pairs. For the subset in which the mean difference was most in favor of A
(mean = +11.4), 90.7% of the preferences favored A. The best fitting regression line through
these five points had a slope of .037, indicating that every one-point increase in the mean
difference score was associated with a 3.7% increase in the percentage of choices favoring city
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the summation model across all pairs of cities.
The choice proportions for specific pairs of cities (e.g., Las Vegas vs. Denver), were found to
be quite similar to the combined plot in Figure 1.
The data in Figure 1 shows that imagery and preference for vacation cities are strongly
related. If cityB has a more positive set of images than city A (as indicated by simply summing
the affect ratings across however many images were produced for each city), thencity B is more
likely to be preferred as a vacation site. If city A has more positive imagery, then city A is
more likely to be preferred as a vacation site.
Predicting Job and Retirement Preferences
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The summation model was applied in similar fashion to the prediction of job preferences
and retirement preferences for the cities survey. The hit rates were similar to those reported
earlier for vacation preferences. The functional relationships relating job and retirement
preferences to image scores were almost identical to the relationship shown in Figure 1.
Results; States Survey
As in the cities survey, more people (41.0%) knew the location of the nuclear weapons
test site than knew the location being considered for the repository (24.5%). The summation
model was found to be about as accurate in predicting vacation, job, and retirement preferences
among states as it was for predicting preferences among cities.
Imagery associated with "a nuclear waste storage facility" and the "nuclear test site" was
extremely negative for respondents in the states survey and was almost identical to the imagery
obtained in the cities survey. Whereas few people in the cities survey expressed nuclear-related
imagery in response to the stimulus words "Las Vegas," about 10% of respondents in the states
survey produced nuclear imagery in response to the stimulus "Nevada." Such images included
the terms nuclear testing, nuclear bomb, nukes, explosions, and radiation. The mean image
score for Nevada for these persons was 0.18. The mean image score for persons who did not
associate Nevada with things nuclear was 2.56 (a statistically significant difference; p < .001).
As expected, persons with nuclear imagery assigned lower (poorer) preference rankings to
Nevada than did persons without such images (see Table III). These findings are important
because they suggest that Nevada has already undergone some stigmatization as a "nuclear
place."
Insert Table III about here
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Results: Corporate Decision Makers Survey
Parallel analyses were carried out with the images and preferences of the corporate
decision makers. The summation model correctly predicted 47% of the first-choice locations
for siting a new business and the functional relationship between image scores and preferences
for pairs of cities looked much like the relationship for vacation preferences in Figure 1.
In summary, three separate surveys totaling more than 1200 respondents demonstrated
that a simple summation model applied to sets of images did agood job ofpredicting expressed
preferences for cities and states in which to vacation, take a new job, retire, or site abusiness.
The slopes of the best-fitting lines relating preferences among pairs of cities/states to differences
in image values were quite steep, indicating that a change in one or two images could imply a
substantial shift in preference probability.
Additional Analyses
Additional studies were done on these data to test and evaluate the linkbetween imagery
and preference.
Independent raters. The predictive accuracy of the summation model was quite high.
One possible criticism of the data collection method is that the high degree of predictability is
an artifact of allowing respondents to rate their own images. People's ratings may have
influenced their preferences, thus inflating the relationship.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a fourth study, using samples ofyoung adults from
Eugene, Oregon as subjects. One group of subjects (N = 150) produced images for four cities
and ranked the same cities according to their attractiveness as vacation sites, much as was done
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in the survey of Phoenix residents. Some respondents produced images first and then indicated
their vacation preferences. Others gave their preferences first. Unlike the Phoenix surveys,
however, subjects in the Oregon survey did not score their own images. Instead, the more than
2000 different images produced by the subjects were rated by adifferent group of28 subjects.
The "artifact" hypothesis predicts that the summation model would have much poorer
predictability in this study, because there is no possibility that image ratings can influence the
preferences (or vice-versa).
The results of this study were surprising. The model's hit rates were excellent (66%
accuracy in predicting first choices) and the functions relating differences in image scores to
preference probability were again remarkably linear, with slopes only slightly less steep than
those obtained in the Phoenix survey. The high predictive accuracy of the image models in the
Phoenix surveys does not appear to be an artifact of the image evaluation procedure used in
those studies.
Insensitive gamblers. Another challenge to the summation model was devised in the form
of a hypothesis that people who like to gamble will not be influenced much by other attributes
of Las Vegas. This hypothesis was tested using 246 respondents in the cities survey who
produced the term "gambling" as one of their images of Las Vegas. These individuals were
separated into subgroups according to the value they assigned to the gambling image. Next, a
separate analysis of the relationship between image difference scores and preference probability
for Las Vegas, analogous to the analysis in Figure 1, was performed within each subgroup.
Difference scores were computed by pairing Las Vegas with each of the other cities and
subtracting the score for the other city from the score for Las Vegas.
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The hypothesis predicts that those who see "gambling" as extremely positive (i.e., who
rated it as a +2) would have vacation preferences for Las Vegas that are less sensitive to image
differences compared to the preferences of people who are less favorable toward gambling (i.e.,
who rate "gambling" as intermediate or negative in value). The data did not support the
hypothesis. The curves relating image score differences to preference probabilities for Las
Vegas were not significantly different for groups of people who differed in their evaluation of
gambling. In other words, people who viewed gambling as avery positive feature of Las Vegas
were just as much influence by other positive and negative images as were people who had less
positive views of gambling.
Effects of repository knowledge and test-site knowledge. Additional analyses were
conducted using the states survey data to determine the impact of knowledge about the state
being considered for the nuclear waste repository and knowledge about the state in which the
nuclear-test site is located upon images and preferences for Nevada as a vacation site. These
two types of knowledge were found to be related. Persons who knew that the repository was
being considered for Nevada were somewhat more likely to know that the test site is in Nevada
(71%) as compared to those who lacked knowledge of the repository (55% knew the test-site
location). Similar results were obtained in the cities survey, where the corresponding values
were 70% and 41%.
Additional analyses showed that the presence of a nuclear image in one's image set for
Nevada was determined more by knowledge of the test-site location than by knowledge of the
repository location. Nuclear imagery was produced by 15%of those persons who knew the test-
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site location compared to 2% of those who did not know the location. Corresponding figures
associated with knowledge and lack ofknowledge of the proposed repository were 12% and 9%.
Summarizing the results from these analyses, we see that the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository has not yet infiltrated people's images of Nevada and has not yet had much effect on
their stated vacation preferences. The test site, which has been a feature of Nevada for many
years, has had a stronger influence on images and preferences. Knowledge that the weapons test
site is in Nevada appears to have led to an increase in nuclear-related imagery for Nevada and
nuclear imagery is associated with decreased preference for Nevada as a vacation site.
Imagery and vacation behavior. The previous analyses demonstrated that images could
predict expressed preferences for vacation sites. Can image scores also predict actual vacation
trips? To address this question we attempted to resurvey the 802 respondents from our 1988
Phoenix surveys some 16-18 months later (October - December, 1989). We were successful in
re-interviewing about 130 persons in each of the two samples (cities survey and states survey)
studied earlier.6 Again, we elicited word associations to each of the same four cities or four
states and asked for positive/negative ratings ofeach image produced. In addition, we asked the
respondents to indicate in which of these cities (or states) they had vacationed since the previous
survey was conducted.
6 Across the two repeat surveys, about 60% of the original respondents could not be
reached because nooneanswered thephone (despite repeated callbacks), thenumber was
no longer valid, or the answering person said that the target individual no longer lived
there. Of the original respondents who were contacted, 83.3% completed the repeat
survey.
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The predictive capability of the word-association image scores was tested by means of
logistic regression analysis using aperson's 1988 image score for astate or city to estimate the
probability that that person would vacation in aplace during the subsequent 16-18 months (until
the date of the repeat survey). The estimated probabilities for both cities and states are
presented in Figures 2and 3. These data show that the affective qualities of aperson's images
of aplace were clearly related to the probability that the person would subsequentiy vacation
there, with the relationship being stronger for states than for cities.
Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here
Image stability. The resurveying of the Phoenix samples provided us with an opportunity
to examine the stability of image scores for states and cities across a 16-18 month time span.
We found moderate stability. More than 60% of the paired image sets provided by the same
person had at least one identical association in both sets. When the 1988 and 1989 image scores
were compared for the same person-same stimulus, they were found to correlate .52 for cities
and .42 for states, across persons. The two image scores were identical in 11.4% of the cases.
Almost 70% of the paired scores were within a range of ± 4 points.
The changes in aperson's image scores likely reflect both systematic changes over time
and unreliability. The unreliability can be reduced by averaging a person's 1988 and 1989
images scores for each city or state. When this is done, the relationship between imagery and
vacations taken between May, 1988 and Autumn, 1989 became even stronger than that shown
in Figures 2and 3. For example, when images scores were averaged, the predicted probability
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of vacationing in a state ranged from about .03 for the lowest mean image score (-12) to about
.70 for the highest mean score (+12). This contrasts with a range between .07 and .61 when
only the 1988 image score is used as a predictor.
DISCUSSION
The present study developed and applied a methodology based upon imagery in order to
overcome concerns about the validity ofdirect questions regarding the potential influence ofa
nuclear waste repository.at Yucca Mountain upon economically important behaviors. The results
supported the three propositions that the research aimed to test: Images of cities and states,
derived from a word-association technique, exhibited positive and negative affective meanings
that were highly predictive of preferences for vacation sites, job and retirement locations, and
business sites (Proposition 1). The concept of anuclear-waste storage facility evoked consistent,
extreme, negative imagery (Proposition 2). The nuclear-weapons test site, which has been
around far longer than the Yucca Mountain nuclear-waste project, has led to a modest amount
of nuclear imagery becoming associated with the state of Nevada. This provides indirect
evidence for Proposition 3, which asserts that nuclear-waste related images will also become
associated with Nevada and Las Vegas if the Yucca Mountain Project proceeds. Nuclear
imagery, when present in a person's associative responses, was found to be linked with much
lower preference for Nevada as a vacation site, the verification of these propositions implies
that the repository also has the potential to cause an increase in nuclear imagery which, in turn,
will produce adverse impacts on tourism and other economically important activities in Nevada.
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In ouropinion, these findings provide a partial answer to the question that motivated the
inquiry. The mechanisms of perceived risk, social amplification, and stigma are observable in
the record of past experience with nuclear and other types of hazards. In the context of the
Yucca Mountain Repository, these mechanisms appear to have the potential to cause substantial
losses to each of the various economics sectors at risk. We believe that it would be unwise and
unfair for development of the nation's high-level nuclear waste repository to proceed without
taking these potential economic impacts into consideration.
Some analysts have suggested that the nuclear weapons test site provides evidence against
the above conclusions, in view of the strong expansion of the Las Vegas visitor economy during
the years in which this facility has been operating. We disagree. Judging from the Phoenix
survey, the test site has worked its way into the imagery of Nevada for only a small percentage
of people and is rarely associated with Las Vegas. Moreover, the operations of the test site have
been restricted and unavailable to full public scrutiny. Nuclear-waste transport, the operation
of the waste repository, and any controversies over the safety of these activities will likely be
far more visible to the public and the media. In particular, tens of thousands of nuclear-waste
shipments by truck or rail throughout the United States will be a prominent reminder of the
repository and its risks. As these shipments converge upon Las Vegas, nuclear associations with
that city may be built to a far greater extent than has occurred with the secret, contained,
underground explosions at the test site. Finally, there is no evidence that the small degree of
association of the test site with the region has not actually impaired tourism and business
development. Apart from the gambling industry, business development has shown little progress
despite the potential attractiveness of Las Vegas for many kinds of industries.
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It may also be the case that the test site and the repository will interact in a synergistic
way to produce nuclear imagery to an extent that is greater than the sum of the individual
contributions from each facility. Little is known about the dynamics of the process by which
images become salient. It is certainly true, however, that individuals have a number of images
associated with any particular place. There may be some threshold of repetition that moves a
weak or unstable image from the periphery into the core image ofa place. If so, Nevada's link
to the nuclear weapons test site may increase its potential for stigmatization from the repository
relative to a state with no existing base of nuclear imagery.
Historical analysis of major risk events has documented substantial socioeconomic
impacts, but these impacts have often been transitory. Will the same impermanence hold for
impacts triggered by a nuclear waste repository? In considering this question, we suggest that
it is useful to distinguish two different kinds of stimuli emanating from the repository. First,
there are the multitude of discrete events that are associated with the project. Second, there is
the cumulative experience with the project, which reflects the characteristics of the project plus
the experience across all project-related events. It is reasonable to suppose that an isolated,
solitary event will generate a transitory response. It is also reasonable, however, to expect that
the imagery of Nevada and Las Vegas held by the general population will reflect their
cumulative experience with the repository program. Each of the discrete events that might result
from the program, therefore, would have the potential to trigger two kinds of consequences-
responses to the vent itself, the duration of which would be related to the nature of the event,
and responses based upon the cumulative image of the repository to which this event makes a
contribution on the margin. Just as this cumulative image will take time to develop, it may also
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be more durable. In fact, to the extent that strong nuclear imagery became associated with the
repository, the host region, or major communities along waste-transportation routes, the
stigmatization could remain for a long time. The sort of associative material that builds an
image is illustrated by the magazine photograph and excerpt shown in Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Although this research has clarified themechanisms by which adverse economic impacts
can be generated, predicting the precise magnitude and duration of those impacts is impossible.
The uncertainties involved in repository development make it inevitable that the actual impacts-
physical, biological, social, and economic-will differ from the best of impact projections. There
are at least four categories of uncertainty. First, the Department of Energy (DOE) plansare still
largely unspecified on crucial matters; for example, it is impossible to know at this time whether
waste shipments will be made by truck or rail, over which routes, and with what frequency or
safeguards. Seconds, the risk-management policies to be followed by state and local
governments are largely unknown, and could have a powerful influence on impacts. Third,
there will certainly be external perturbations and surprises that may cause the repository
development to differ from anything that can be foreseen at this time. Fourth, economically
relevant decisions are always made in the context of alternatives; quantitative prediction requires
currently unavailable knowledge of the alternatives that individuals and society will be able to
choose among in the future.
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In sum, our analysis indicates that the development of the Yucca Mountain Repository
will, in effect, force Nevadans to gamble with their future economy. The nature of that gamble
cannot be specified precisely, but it appears to include credible possibilities (with unknown
probabilities) of substantial losses to the visitor economy, the migrant economy, and the business
economy.
As the potential for the repository tohave adverse economic impacts becomes recognized
by citizens of Nevada and their government officials, the already strong political opposition to
the site can be expected to intensity, making it extremely difficult for the federal government
to proceed with the project.7
Beyond Yucca Mountain. The present inquiry has implications for social-impact analysis
that transcend the conflicts and concerns surrounding the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
The processes of social amplification and stigma appear relevant, as well, to the analysis of
impacts from any major facility that produces, uses, transports, or disposes of hazardous
materials. The numerous proposed sites for disposal of low-level radioactive wastes and the
many sites being considered for chemical-waste incinerators, and landfills will face similar
problems ofperceived risk and its impacts, though probably toa lesser degree than the problems
posed for Nevadans by a Yucca Mountain repository. The present study has demonstrated that
7 In June, 1989, the Nevada State Legislature passed a bill, AB 222, making it unlawful
for any person or governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada.
Concern that a high-level radioactive waste repository could severely damage the
economy and environment of the state was cited by the legislature as a major factor in
the passage of this bill. In current litigation between the State of Nevada and the
Department of Energy, lawyers from the state's Attorney General's Office have
repeatedly cited potential adverse economic impacts to support the state's opposition to
the repository program.
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the so-called "standard effects" of large engineering projects on local employment, housing, and
transportation have the potential to be dwarfed by the "special effects" of risk perception and
stigma. However, just as physical or technical risks can be mitigated by proper safety design
and management, effects of perceived risk may be mitigated by means of management processes
that instill and maintain trust and that work to protect the economic base of those individuals and
communities whom the facility puts at risk.
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Table I
-
Images Associated with an "Underground Nuclear Waste Storage Facility"
Category Frequency
179
Images Included in Category
1. Dangerous dangerous, danger, hazardous, toxic, unsafe, harmful, disaster
2. Death/Sickness 107 death, dying, sickness, cancer
3. Negative 99 negative, wrong, bad, unpleasant, terrible, gross, undesirable, awful, dislike, ugly, horrible
4. Pollution 97 pollution, contamination, leakage, spills* Love Canal
5. War 62 war, bombs, nuclear war, holocaust
6. Radiation 59 radiation, nuclear, radioactive glowing
7. Scary 55 scary, frightening, concern, worried, fear, horror
8. Somewhere Else 49 wouldn't want to live near one, not where I live, far away as possible
9. Unnecessary 44 unnecessary, bad idea, waste of land
10. Problems 39 problems, trouble
11. Desert 37 desert, barren, desolate »
12. Non-Nevada Locations 35 Utah, Arizona, Denver 4
13. Nevada/Las Vegas 34 Nevada (25), Las Vegas (9) 1
14. Storage Location 32 caverns, underground salt mine
15. Government/Industry 23 government-, politics, big business
1
1Basis: N = 402 respondents in Phoenix, Arizona
1
3
-»»
•ft
>• <
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Table II
Images, Ratings, and Summation Scores for Respondent 132
Sample Subject Image
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
Image
Ratinf '
SAN DIEGO
SAN DIEGO
SAN DIEGO
SAN DIEGO
SAN DIEGO
SAN DIEGO
2
2
2
1
1
2
very nice
good beaches
zoo
busy freeway
easy to find way
pretty town
Sum = 10
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
LAS VEGAS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sum =
-2
-1
-1
-1
-2
0
-7
rowdy town
busy town
casinos
bright lights
too much gambling
out of the way
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
DENVER
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sum =
2
0
2
1
-2
-2
1
high
crowded
cool
pretty
busy airport
busy streets
LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES
LOS ANGELES
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sum =
-2
-2
-2
-1
0
-2
-9
smoggy
crowded
dirty
foggy
sunny
drug place
Note: Based on these summation scores, this person's predicted preference order for a vacation
site would be: San Diego, Las Vegas, and Los Angeles.
Risk Perception and Nuclear Waste I 36
Table m
Preference for Nevada as a Vacation Site Among Respondents
Who Do and Do Not Exhibit Nuclear Imagery
Nevada Preference Rank
12 3 4 Mean Rank
Nuclear Imagery Present 3 3 46 49 3.41
(N = 39)
Nuclear Imagery Absent 6 16 51 27 2.98
(N = 354)
Note: Cell entries are percentages within each row.
«>
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Relationship between mean image score differences (City A-City B) and
proportion of times (P) City A was ranked higher than City B in the respondent's preference
rankings for vacation sites. All possible pairs of cities are included in this analysis.
Figure 2. Probability of vacationing in a particular city after June, 1988 as a function
of image scores elicited prior to that date (Phoenix survey). Upper row of numbers indicates
the number of people with that image score who vacationed in the city; lower row is the number
who did not vacation in the city; X marks the proportion who vacationed. The curve is the best
fit logistic function to these proportions.
Figure 3. Probability of vacationing in a particular state after June, 1988 as a function
of image scores elicited prior to that date (Phoenix survey). Upper row of numbers indicates
the number of people with that image score who vacationed in the state; lower row is the
number who did not vacation in the state; X marks the proportion who vacationed. The curve
is the best fit logistic function to these proportions.
Figure4. Many kinds of associations contribute to thedevelopment of an image (Source:
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1990, 46(2), p. 10).
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